THE QUEST FOR INTEREST-FREE KNOWLEDGE:AN EVALUATION OF JURGEN HABERMAS' METHOD OF RADICAL SELF-REFLECTION

THE QUEST FOR INTEREST-FREE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVALUATION OF JURGEN HABERMAS’ METHOD OF RADICAL SELF- REFLECTION.

INTRODUCTION:
Jurgen Habermas was a German philosopher and sociologist. He belongs to the school of thought known as the Frankfurt School or critical theorists. He criticizes the historical and empirical – analytical models of hermeneutics for their being embedded in interest. Hence, their conclusions are not validated as knowledge but remain at the level of doxa (opinion). Habermas, though preoccupied with search for interest-free knowledge, in his critique of previous hermeneutic models aims not at discarding those models but its subject them to criticism based on radical self-reflection which is the basis of his methodology.

INTEREST:
For Habermas there are three basic interest that dominate the search for knowledge. The first is technical interest in controlling objects in the environment. The second is the practical interest in being able to understand each other and join in common activity. The third and last is the emancipatory interest in securing freedom from distortions in our understanding. The first two interests presuppose a state of opinion, not knowledge. Knowledge comes about only when the third interest is incorporated and superimposed on the two other interests. But how is the possible?

METHOD OF RADICAL SELF-RDEFLECTION:
This method relies on analysis and criticism of the first two elements of interest in the conclusions of hermeneutic models, on the basis of the third interest. It seeks to harmonize the interests of practical outcome and technically oriented action with the interest of emancipating or avoiding distortions and misconceptions the two former interests engender. Through self-reflection, individuals become aware of forces which have exerted a hitherto unacknowledged influence over them.
The method of radical self-reflection is itself driven by an interest: of emancipating knowledge from merely pragmatic concerns by unraveling and eliminating of preconceptions and distortions through criticism. This criticism validates doxa (opinion or ideology) to the status of knowledge. Thus, through the application of the third interest, all the other interests are neutralized. Self-reflection, however, should not be seen as a personal activity. It is the presentation of the conclusions of the hermeneutic models to a general appreciation. The essence of this is to establish the conclusions and theories of the cultural sciences as objective knowledge – independent of personal and goal orientations. This is achieved, Habermas believes, based on the use of theoretical framework (emancipating interest ) to broaden out the narrow pragmatic interests. But is this not, we are obliged to ask, self- defeating?
The flaw of the logic is obvious: knowledge is marred by the first and second interests are not knowledge but opinion (ideology); to become validated as knowledge we need to add another interest.

IS INTEREST- FREE KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE IN SOCIAL SCIENCE?
knowledge, when actively pursued, have never had an aesthetic value. It is pursued for its usefulness. This underlies Francis Bacon’s maxim that ‘knowledge is power’. In social science the subject and object of knowledge are intertwined. Hence, knowledge cannot wholly be objective- since the elements of unconscious distortion and idiosyncrasies are intently ever present. In natural science, however, this factor is not so pronounced, for the knowledge situation is quite different. The subject and object of knowledge are disparate to a very high degree. Thus in social science, going by Habermas’ radical self-reflection, the context of validation should not be the elimination of interest, as this is wholly impossible – given the knowledge situation. Knowledge in natural science is aimed ultimately at being translated into technology; likewise, in the social science it is geared towards translation into relevant and efficacious policies and programmes. Policies are determined by an aim an interest.
Hence, it is not incompatible that knowledge in this field should have interest, nor is it appropriate that such knowledge should be derided as opinion on that account. All of man’s endeavours to know in all his spheres of existence, are not ornamental but pragmatic. For knowledge is power to change, transform and overcome difficulties in our environment for our wellbeing. Thus, in so far as man is possessed by an active desire, need or interest to know, that knowledge, when acquired, cannot be divorced from the interest that engendered it.
Habermas, therefore in this method of radical self-reflection merely establish a vicious circle. For it is inconceivable for the third (emancipatory ) interest to completely neutralize the first and second interests. Hence, upon a careful examination, it inconceivable that human beings would ever pursue knowledge with no reasonable end in mind. This obtains even in natural science. No scientist can embark on any research without being motivated by an interest. This interest in the natural science, is to a large degree possible to be relegated to the background, but cannot be absolutely divorced from the knowledge itself. This is even truer in the human or social science.
CONCLUSION
Jurgen Habermas attempts at establishing objectivity in knowledge in the social science through the method of radical self reflection. This attempt is highly commendable and even necessary. However, his method is flawed by its attempt to use interest to neutral or eliminate other interests.Hence it is self-defecting. Self-reflection which is an intersubjective interest (of a wider community) cannot eliminate completely the practical and technical interest which are the most fundamental constituent of all scientific knowledge. This is not by itself a serious issue; neither should interest ridden theories be derided as opinions, for all our conscience activities are driven by interest.


END NOTE
1 David Held, Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer
To Habermas ,(Berkeley and los Angeles: University California press, 1986). p.318